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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
PlaintiflTRespondent Roger Eggett ("Eggett") agrees with the Statement of Jurisdiction 
in the Brief of Defendant/Petitioner Wasatch Energy Corp. ("Wasatch"). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED 
1. Whether the Court of Appeals correctly affirmed the trial court's exercise of 
discretion in admitting evidence of accounting adjustments to prove Eggett's claim for breach 
of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and the resulting damages? 
Standard of Review: On certiorari, this Court reviews the decision of the Court of 
Appeals for correctness, which turns on whether the Court of Appeals accurately reviewed 
the trial court's decision under the appropriate standard of review. Clark v. Clark, 27 P.3d 
538 (Utah 2001). Whether the trial court properly admitted evidence is reviewed for abuse 
of discretion. Gorostieta v. Parkinson, 17 P.3d 1110 (Utah 2000). An appellate court can 
find abuse of discretion only if no reasonable person would take the view adopted by the trial 
court. Brewer v. Denver & Rio Grande West R.R., 31 P.3d 557 (Utah 2001). 
Preservation of Issue: Wasatch objected to the admission of the evidence to vary the 
unambiguous contractual terms, as a violation of the parol evidence rule. (Trial Transcript, 
("Tr.") 256-57,264), by motion for directed verdict (Tr. 908-09), and by pretrial motions in 
limine. (Tr. 1-8) and to compel discovery (Record ("R") 141, 165-68). 
Before this court, Wasatch never objected to the admission of the accounting 
adjustments on the ground that Eggett did not "seek recovery" for the breach of covenant 
claim on the verdict form. Wasatch raised this ground for the first time in its Reply Brief 
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before the Court of Appeals. Accordingly, Wasatch has waived this objection, now raised 
at pages 18-19 of Brief of Petitioner ("Pet. Br."). 
2. Whether the Court of Appeals correctly affirmed the trial court's exercise of 
discretion under Utah R. Civ. P. 47(r) in clarifying the jury's intention and verdict that 
$ 135,671.96 was the book value of Eggett's shares, and the amount to be awarded to Eggett? 
Standard of Review: See Standard of Review for Point I, supra. The standard of 
review of the trial court's actions under Rule 47(r) is abuse of discretion. Jorgensen v. 
Gonzales, 383 P.2d 934 (Utah 1963), and cases cited at pp. 25-34, infra. 
Preservation of Issue. Wasatch objected to the trial court's authority to clarify the 
jury's answer. (Tr. 990, 994.) Wasatch never objected to the form of the polling question 
to all jurors, and has waived its objection to the form of that question. 
3. Whether the Court of Appeals correctly affirmed the trial court's award of 
costs of attorneys' fees to Eggett as the prevailing party, on the ground that Wasatch failed 
to marshal evidence relied upon by the trial court in making the award? 
Standard of Review: Correction of error. However, the Court of Appeals could have 
affirmed on the independent ground that the trial court properly exercised its discretion in 
awarding fees. Valcarce v. Fitzgerald, 961 P.2d 305 (Utah 1998). 
Preservation of Issue: Wasatch objection to the propriety of the fees by post-trial 
motion. (R. 331.) Wasatch never objected to the adequacy of the trial court's finding, and 
approved the Supplemental Judgment as to form. (Pet. Br. Add. 21). Wasatch has waived 
its objection to the adequacy of the trial court's findings. 
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DETERMINATIVE LEGAL PROVISION 
Eggett agrees with Wasatch's Statement of Important Legal Provision. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Eggett is the founder and former president of Wasatch, and the former chairman of 
its Board of Directors. In April 1997, when Eggett resigned as president and board 
chairman, he was the largest shareholder, owning 36.5% of Wasatch's shares (Tr. 256.). 
Eggett's resignation as board chairman was effective immediately; his resignation as 
preseident was to be effective after 90 days, pursuant to his Employment Agreement. In May 
1997, Wasatch purported to terminate Eggett for cause. Based on the purported termination, 
Wasatch asserted that a Shareholder's Agreement entitled Wasach to purchase Eggett's 
shares for par value ($1,216.70) rather than book value. (Tr. 149). 
Eggett brought this action, alleging three claims for relief. (R. 1-7.) The first claim 
alleged that Wasatch breached his Employment Agreement by refusing to pay Eggett 
additional compensation from January 1, 1997 through his resignation. The second claim 
alleged that Wasatch breached his Shareholders' Agreement by refusing to pay Eggett book 
value for his shares. The third claim alleged that Wasatch breached the covenant of good 
faith and fair dealing inherent in the Employment Agreement and Shareholders' Agreement. 
Wasatch asserted counterclaims, alleging that Eggett took excessive compensation, and 
abused his expense account. (R. 17-26.) 
The jury found for Eggett on all his claims and against Wasatch on all its 
counterclaims. The jury awarded Eggett $11,188 in additional compensation, which was 
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exactly equal to the remaining compensation owed to Eggett for March and April, 1997 
($9,634 + $2,254 = $11,188). The jury also awarded Eggett $135,671.96 as book value for 
his shares. This amount was exactly equal to Wasatch's audited book value ($75,452), with 
an adjustment for suspense account items wrongfully manipulated by Wasatch in breach of 
the covenant of good faith and fair dealing ($296,252), multiplied by Eggett's ownership 
percentage ($75,452 + $296,252 x 36.5% = $135,671.96). (Slip. Op., J 37.) 
Upon reading the Special Verdict Form, the trial court clarified the jury's intention 
and verdict that $135,671.35 was the book value of Eggett's shares, and the amount to be 
awarded to Eggett, not the book value of all Wasatch shares. The trial court questioned the 
jury foreman twice, and then questioned all jurors. The jurors answered unanimously and 
decisively that $135,671.96 was the amount to be paid to Eggett for his shares. The trial 
court then entered the verdict and discharged the jury. (Tr. 988-95.) 
The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court unanimously. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Wasatch presents a distorted selection of facts and exhibits to renew the arguments 
that the jury rejected. On appeal this Court views the evidence and all reasonable inferences 
in the light most favorable to the verdict. See, e.g. E.A. Strout Western Realty Agency, Inc. 
v. W. C. Foy & Sons, Inc., 665 P.2d 1320 (Utah 1983). Those facts and inferences include: 
Eggett's Founding of Wasatch. Eggett, a former CPA and auditor, founded Wasatch 
in 1993, to market natural gas between small producers and suppliers. (Tr. 103-08.) In April 
1995, Eggett and two other Wasatch principals entered separate Employment Agreements 
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with Wasatch, and a joint Shareholders'Agreement. (Pet. Br. Add. 38-48.) 
Relevant Terms of the Shareholders' Agreement. Paragraph 2 of the Shareholders' 
Agreement provided that the remaining shareholders and then Wasatch could purchase the 
shares of a withdrawing shareholder. Paragraph 3 provided that a shareholder who resigned 
would be paid book value for his shares; a shareholder who was terminated for cause would 
be paid the lesser of book value or the price paid by the shareholder. Id. 
Paragraph 18(d) defined book value as 'the consolidated net shareholders' equity" as 
"certified to by the firm of independent public accountants then regularly employed by" 
Wasatch. Paragraph 18(d) also specified that the determination of book value "shall be made 
on an accrual basis in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles and shall be 
binding and conclusive upon the parties." Id. 
Wasatch's Explosive Growth and Eggett's Resignation. In late 1996 and early 1997, 
Wasatch grew tremendously, faster than anyone expected. (Tr. 125.) January through 
March 1997 were the most profitable months ever; Wasatch made more than half a million 
dollars in January alone. (Tr. 249,258,770-75.) (This unanticipated and continuing growth 
explains why the book value of Eggett's shares turned out to be much higher than Eggett 
anticipated in his resignation letter or in his Complaint.) 
Due to management disputes, Eggett resigned by correspondence on April 15,1997. 
Pursuant to his Employment Agreement, Eggett gave 90 days notice of his resignation as 
president, and informed Wasatch that his last day of employment would be July 15, 1997. 
(Tr. 125-30,132-34.) When Wasatch refused to confirm Eggett's employment status, Eggett 
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retained counsel, who requested by correspondence dated April 29,1997, that Wasatch pay 
to Eggett his compensation from January 1 through July 15, 1997. (Tr. 145.) 
Wasatch's Breaches of the Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing. From the 
moment Eggett retained counsel to protect his interests, Wasatch acted in bad faith to avoid 
honoring its agreement to pay Eggett's compensation, and to avoid honoring its agreement 
to pay Eggett book value for his shares. By correspondence dated May 16, 1997, Wasatch 
purported to terminate Eggett for cause, as a pretext to avoid its agreements. (Tr. 148-50.) 
Afterward, Wasatch prepared its year-end financial statements for a adit. In so doing, 
management (not the auditor) made adjustments to the monthly financial statements that 
reduced Wasatch's income and audited book value by hundreds of thousands of dollars. 
Wasatch made no adjustments that increased its book value, even though Wasatch had every 
incentive to increase book value to show a stronger financial position to its bankers and 
business partners. (Tr. 575-76, 663-64.) Because the adjustments were contrary to its 
incentive, Wasatch's only motive was to deny Eggett book value for his shares. (R. 679.) 
Suspense Account Adjustments. At trial, Eggett and Wasatch presented evidence 
about the purpose and effect of Wasatch's adjustments for a "swap" contract, for the 
"Gryndberg" contract, and to Wasatch's suspense account. (E.g., Tr. 268-80, 384-88, 580-
87.)1 The suspense account adjustments are relevant to Wasatch's appeal. 
]In his initial testimony, Eggett testified to another adjustment for the United Utilities lawsuit. 
Eggett withdrew the adjustment in rebuttal, because the auditor testified that the auditor, not Wasatch 
management, made that adjustment. Wasatch management, however, made all other adjustments. 
(Tr. 890-92.) 
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When Eggett was president, Wasatch maintained a suspense account, where Wasatch 
accounted for disputed income actually received from certain customers. Wasatch held the 
income in the suspense account for one year, to avoid treating it as earned income and paying 
bonuses or profit sharing on it. At the end of the fiscal year, as Eggett prepared the financial 
statements for audit, Eggett transferred entries that were more than a year old from the 
suspense account to retained earnings. (Tr. 272-74.) 
After Eggett was terminated, Wasatch management extended the suspense account 
period from one to two years. (Tr. 274.) Wasatch's auditor testified that he had no role in 
the decision, but was just told about it. Wasatch could have made the adjustment solely to 
deprive Eggett of book value for his shares, and the auditor would not have known a thing 
about it. (R. 671-78.) The auditor also testified that management, not the auditor, prepares 
the financial statements. The auditor expresses an opinion on their fairness, and relies on the 
representations of management. Management could mislead the auditor, and the auditor 
would not know if management had a different reason for doing something. (R. 671-72.) 
As a result of the adjustment, Wasatch transferred no income from the suspense 
account to retained earnings for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1997. If Wasatch had 
followed its prior practice under Eggett, and applied a one-year period, its auditors would 
have shifted $296,252 of income to retained earnings, and would have included it in the 
calculation of book value in the audited financial statements. (Tr. 276-77, 682.) 
At trial, Eggett calculated damages by reversing the adjustments made by Wasatch 
management to deprive Eggett of book value for his shares, in breach of the covenant of good 
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faith and fair dealing. Eggett treated these adjustments the same way he would have treated 
them in preparing the year-end financial statements for audit, as president of Wasatch, in the 
ordinary course of business, and without an eye to the advantageous exercise of a buy-out 
agreement (Tr. 299, 889.) 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Point I. The Court of Appeals correctly affirmed the trial court's exercise of 
discretion in admitting evidence relating to accounting adjustments to prove Eggett's claim 
that Wasatch breached the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Indeed, Wasatch admits 
that parol evidence is admissible to prove a breach of the covenant, even if it is not 
admissible to vary or interpret the contract terms. Eggett was fully entitled to present 
evidence that Wasatch made the adjustments to its financial statements to reduce the audited 
book value of its shares, and the amount to be paid to Eggett for his shares. Eggett also was 
fully entitled to reverse Wasatch's adjustments to calculate his damages - the book value of 
his shares if Wasatch had not breached the covenant by manipulating its financial statements. 
Wasatch attempts to erase the breach of covenant claim from the record, arguing that 
Eggett did not "seek recovery" for the claim on the verdict form. Wasatch never raised this 
objection at trial, and has waived it. Even so, Eggett alleged the claim and argued it at trial. 
The jury was instructed on it; the verdict form specifically identifies Wasatch's "agreements 
and obligations" under the Shareholders' Agreement (which includes its obligation of good 
faith and fair dealing). If there were any doubt as to whether Eggett sought recovery on the 
claim, every principle of appellate review required the Court of Appeals to affirm. 
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Point n. The Court of Appeals correctly affirmed the trial court's exercise of 
discretion in clarifying the jury's intention and verdict that $135,671.96 was the book value 
of Eggett's shares, not all Wasatch shares. A trial court has discretion under Utah R. Civ. 
P. 47(r) and this Court's precedent in Jorgensen v. Gonzales, 383 P.2d 934 (Utah 1963), to 
question a jury to determine if a verdict is informal, insufficient, or ambiguous. Courts 
throughout the country under a variety of procedural rules, including rules substantially 
identical to Rule 47(r), emphasize that a trial court has a duty to resolve informality, 
insufficiency, ambiguity or inconsistency before a jury is discharged, and may question 
jurors to do so. Wasatch's attempt to restrict Rule 47(r) to instances of "patent" error, and 
to preclude a trial court from questioning jurors to determine if there was patent error, 
conflicts with these authorities. If adopted, Wasatch's interpretation would eviscerate Rule 
47(r), and needlessly prevent a trial court from using it "to the end that the issues be fully 
tried, deliberated upon and a correct verdict rendered." Jorgensen, supra, 383 P.2d at 935. 
In response to the trial court's questions, the jury foreman twice answered that 
$135,671.96 was the book value to be paid to Eggett for his shares. The jurors unanimously 
confirmed the foreman's answers. Any fair reading of the record confirms the Court of 
Appeals' conclusion that the trial court did not coerce the jury or take away its decision 
making authority. Further, there can be no question that the jury calculated the book value 
of Eggett's shares, because $ 135,671.96 equals the audited book value of Wasatch ($75,452), 
adjusted by the suspense account items ($296,252), and multiplied by Eggett's ownership 
percentage (36.5%). Consequently, any error in the form of the trial Court's questions to the 
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jury is harmless, because there is no likelihood that the foreman or the jury would have 
answered different questions differently. 
Point III. The Court of Appeals correctly affirmed the trial court's award of fees and 
costs, because Wasatch failed to marshal the facts supporting the trial court's factual 
findings. Wasatch attempts to evade its duty to marshal the facts, and the standard of review, 
by asserting that the trial court made no apportionment at all between recoverable and non-
recoverable fees, and couching its appeal as a "legal" challenge. In the Supplemental 
Judgment, however, the trial court plainly apportioned fees, and made factual findings 
supporting its conclusion that further apportionment was not appropriate. Because 
Wasatch's real challenge was to the factual findings, Wasatch was required to marshal the 
supporting facts. The Court of Appeals correctly affirmed because Wasatch did not do so. 
Even if the marshaling requirement did not apply, the Court of Appeals should have 
affirmed the trial court on other grounds. First, Wasatch waived its objection to the 
adequacy of the trial court's findings, because it never raised that objection below, and even 
approved the Supplemental Judgment as to form. Second, the trial court acted well within 
its discretion in awarding Eggett all fees (with some exceptions) incurred after May 16,1997. 
The trial court found that the facts to be discovered and tried on all claims were inextricably 
intertwined. Indeed, the facts relating to Eggett's compensation claim and to Wasatch's 
counterclaims would have been litigated whether or not those claims had been filed, because 
Wasatch asserted those facts as a defense to Eggett's claims under the Shareholders' 
Agreement, as a justification for his purported termination for cause. The trial court properly 
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held in its discretion that, because the facts and theories were intertwined, that Eggett was 
recover fees incurred on claims which did not provide for an attorneys' fees award. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE COURT OF APPEALS CORRECTLY AFFIRMED THE TRIAL 
COURT'S EXERCISE OF DISCRETION IN ADMITTING EVIDENCE OF 
ACCOUNTING ADJUSTMENTS TO PROVE EGGETT'S CLAIM FOR 
BREACH OF THE COVENANT OF GOOD FAITH AND FAIR DEALING. 
A. Wasatch Misstates the Grounds on Which the Court of Appeals Affirmed. 
Wasatch appealed to the Court of Appeals this issue: "Whether the trial court erred 
in admitting evidence of plaintiffs adjustments to company book value, contrary to the 
shareholder agreement that book value would be established by the company's year-end 
audited financial statement." (Respondent's Brief Addendum ("Res. Br. Add.") 5). 
Wasatch now misstates the ground on which the Court of Appeals affirmed. Twice 
Wasatch states that the Court of Appeals affirmed admission of the accounting adjustments 
on "supposed equitable principles." (Pet. Br. 13, 16.) The Court of Appeals never did so; 
those words never appear in its Opinion. Neither did the Court of Appeals "interpret" the 
Shareholders' Agreement, or find it ambiguous. In fact, the Court of Appeals agreed with 
Wasatch that the adjustments were inadmissible to vary the express terms of the Agreement. 
The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court because the accounting adjustments 
were admissible to prove Eggett's claim that Wasatch manipulated the financial statements 
to reduce Wasatch's book value, in breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing: 
Although we agree with Wasatch that extrinsic evidence is not 
generally admissible to vary the terms of an otherwise unambiguous contract, 
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we find no reason why this otherwise relevant evidence may not be offered in 
support of Eggett's claim for breach of the covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing. Indeed, Wasatch makes no argument why this evidence should not 
be admitted in support of Eggett's good faith claim. (Slip Op., 120) 
For the reasons stated below, Wasatch continues to make no real argument why the 
adjustments were not admissible to prove Eggett's breach of covenant claim. 
B. Unquestionably, Extrinsic Evidence is Admissible to Prove a Breach of the 
Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing, as Wasatch Has Admitted. 
At argument before the Court of Appeals, and again in its Reply Brief in Support of 
Petition for Writ of Certiorari ("Reply Brief), Wasatch admitted that the covenant of good 
faith and fair dealing inheres in the Shareholders' Agreement, and that extrinsic evidence is 
admissible to prove a breach of the covenant. Wasatch told the Court of Appeals, "[tjhat's 
Utah law and nobody disagrees with that." Wasatch's Reply Brief admitted that "[n]o one 
questions that law or its application to the Shareholders' Agreement." (Res. Br. Add. 2, 7.) 
Even without these admissions, there could be no question that extrinsic evidence is 
admissible to prove a breach of the covenant. As this Court stated in St. Benedict's Dev. Co. 
v. St. Benedict's Hosp„, 811 P.2d 194, 199-200 (Utah 1991): 
Under the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, each party impliedly 
promises that he will not intentionally or purposely do anything which will 
destroy or injure the other party's right to receive the fruits of the contract.. 
. . A violation of the covenant gives rise to a claim for breach of contract... 
. To comply with his obligation to perform a contract in good faith, a party's 
actions must be consistent with the agreed common purpose and the justified 
expectations of the other party. 
Id. at 199-200 (Utah 1991). See also, CIG Exploration, Inc. v. State of Utah, 24 P.3d 966 
(Utah 2001), and cases cited therein (affirming that covenant inheres in "every contract"). 
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Most important, St. Benedict's held that parol evidence of the surrounding facts and 
circumstances must be admitted to prove a breach of the covenant, and the resulting injury 
and damage. In St. Benedict 's the trial court did precisely what Wasatch requested the trial 
court to do here - apply the express terms of the contract and exclude parol evidence as to 
the conduct of the parties. This Court reversed, stating unequivocally that an 
examination of express contract terms alone is insufficient to determine 
whether there has been a breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing. To comply with his obligation to perform a contract in good faith, a 
party's actions must be consistent with the agreed common purpose and 
justified expectations of the other party. The purpose, intentions and 
expectations of the parties should be determined by considering the contract 
language and the course of dealings between and conduct of the parties. 
St. Benedict's, supra, 811 P.2d at 200. A legion of Utah cases has followed St. Benedict's 
in admitting parol evidence at trial, or considering it when denying motions to dismiss, for 
summary judgment, or for directed verdict.2 
This fundamental principle was the foundation for the trial court's admission of the 
accounting adjustments, and the Court of Appeals' affirmance. Eggett claimed at trial that 
Wasatch (not its auditor) adjusted its financial statements to reduce audited book value, and 
2See, e.g., Brown v. Weis, 871 P.2d 552,565 (Utah App. 1994) (refusing to dismiss a breach 
of covenant claim, because "many of the key historical facts, and the inferences fairly to be drawn 
therefrom, are in dispute," and noting that "determining whether a breach of the covenant has 
occurred requires a review of more than just the text of the contract itself... is generally one of fact, 
not law, and thus is ordinarily left to the jury or the finder of fact"); Western Farm Credit Bank v. 
Pratt, 860 P.2d 376, 380 (Utah App. 1993), cert, denied, 879 P.2d 266 (Utah 1994) (denying 
summary judgment on the basis of parol evidence, and stating that whether there has been a breach 
of the covenant is "generally a factual issue to be determined by [the fact finder] after consideration 
of all attendant circumstances and evidenced emphasis added). Accord, PDQ Lube Center, Inc. 
v. Huber, 949 P.2d 792 (Utah App. 1997). 
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the amount it would have to pay Eggett for his shares. As Wasatch argues, the Shareholders' 
Agreement provided that book value would be determined by the audited financial 
statements. Eggett had the "justified expectation" that Wasatch would act in good faith, and 
would not do anything to deprive Eggett of the benefit of this bargain in agreeing to be bound 
by audited book value. Wasatch had the corresponding duty to act in good faith to ensure 
that Eggett realized his justified expectation - true and accurate audited book value. 
Wasatch's assertion that the adjustments were "plainly and expressly offered for the 
purpose of increasing [Eggett's] book value"(Pet. Br. 19), misses the point. The accounting 
adjustments were admissible and admitted to prove that Wasatch deprived Eggett of his 
justified expectations by manipulating the financial statements to reduce audited book value 
and the money owed to Eggett. Eggett was entitled to reverse the adjustments at trial, 
because that was the measure of his damages caused by Wasatch's breach of the covenant. 
Wasatch also argues that the Court of Appeals erred "by characterizing the contract 
issue as relating solely to admission of evidence, and, accordingly, applying an abuse-of 
discretion standard." (Pet. Br. 18.) But that is the issue that Wasatch appealed. Indeed, the 
Court of Appeals quoted Point I of Wasatch's Brief. See Slip Op., f 25 ("Wasatch argues 
the trial court erred by 'admitting Eggett's adjustments'...") 
Wasatch cannot now complain that the Court of Appeals should have addressed the 
issue as a "matter of contract interpretation and enforcement." But if the Court of Appeals 
had done so, the result would have been the same. Because the adjustments were admissible 
to prove Eggett's claim for breach of the covenant and damages, Wasatch would not have 
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been entitled to a directed verdict on the claim, and would not have prevailed if it had 
appealed on that ground. This Court should affirm the Court of Appeals, whether the 
standard of review was abuse of discretion, or correction of error. 
C. Eggett's Claim for Breach of the Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing 
Was Properly Presented to the Jury, and the Jury Awarded Damages on It. 
Faced with its admissions that the accounting adjustments were admissible to prove 
a breach of the covenant, Wasatch is forced to attempt to erase the claim from the trial. 
Wasatch argues that Eggett "sought no recovery for that claim" because the Special Verdict 
Form is "absolutely silent on the subject." (Pet. Br. 18, 19.) The argument is contradicted 
by the clear record, and it violates every principle of appellate review. 
1. Eggett Presented the Breach of Covenant Claim to the Jury. 
Eggett's breach of covenant claim was the Third Claim for Relief in the Complaint. 
(R. 6.) Eggett presented the claim in opening statement. (Tr. 69-70, 79.) Jury Instruction 
27 (following MUJI) instructed the jury on the elements of the claim. (Tr. 921-22.) Eggett 
argued in closing that the third claim for relief 
is for breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. As you've just 
heard the judge instruct you, the covenant of good faith and fair dealing is a 
covenant that adheres in every contract. And what it says is that each party 
will treat the others honestly and fairly. We claim that Wasatch did not treat 
Mr. Eggett fairly and honestly in terminating him or in refusing to pay his 
compensation. We claim that they acted in bad faith and Fm going to describe 
the facts to you in a moment that prove that bad faith. (Tr. 938.) 
Eggett then argued that Wasatch made the adjustments to the accounting statements in breach 
of the covenant to deprive Eggett of book value: 
15 
All these [adjustments] were made by management. As [Wasatch's counsel] 
told you, management had an incentive to inflate its income, to look 
(inaudible) financial statements. The only reason to make these adjustments 
if you're management in the face of that incentive, is to deny Mr. Eggett book 
value for [his] shares. (Tr. 975.) 
Contrary to Wasatch's reading, the verdict form included Eggett's breach of covenant 
claim. Question 3 asked, do "you find that Wasatch Energy breached its agreements or 
obligations to Roger Eggett by terminating Roger Eggett for cause and not paying him book 
value for his shares of stock." (Pet. Br. Apdd. 23.) (emphasis added). Question 3 identified 
generally "agreements and obligations," not the Shareholders' Agreement or the covenant 
of good faith, because the parties agreed to include both claims in a single question. The 
parties specifically used "obligations," because this Court used that word in St. Benedict's 
to refer to the covenant. See 811 P.2d at 200 ("[t]o comply with his obligation to perform 
a contract in good faith, a party's actions must be consistent with the agreed common 
purpose and the justified expectations of the other party") (emphasis added). Jury Instruction 
27 informed the jury that "a breach of the covenant is a breach of the contract." (Tr. 922.) 
As the jury's answer proves, the jury understood that Question 3 included the claim 
for breach of the covenant as well as the claim for breach of the express terms of the 
Shareholders' Agreement. When the jury awarded Eggett $ 135,671.96 as book value for his 
shares, the award represented the damages caused by Wasatch's breach of the covenant. 
Moreover, if there were any doubt as to whether Eggett "sought recovery" on the 
breach of covenant claim, every principle of appellate review would have required the Court 
of Appeals to affirm the jury verdict. As this Court has stated, a special verdict form that 
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"does not specify the basis of liability adopted is more in the nature of a general verdict." 
Cook Assoc, Inc. v. Warnick, 664 P.2d 1161, 1164 n. 1 (Utah 1983). Such verdicts 
are to construed with a view to sustaining the verdict and the intention of the 
jury, and where that intention is not clearly apparent from the verdict itself, 
inferences may be drawn from evidence, pleadings, jury instructions, and other 
relevant portions of the record. 
Id. at 1164 (Utah 1983). As this Court also has stated, "[presumptions and intendments 
cannot be indulged in to establish a contradiction or inconsistency in the findings or answers 
of a jury to special interrogatories, the presumption always being to the contrary." Weber 
Basin Water Conser. Dist. v. Nelson, 358 P.2d 81, 83 (Utah 1960) (emphasis added). 
Wasatch cites no authority for its assertion that Eggett did not "seek recovery" on the 
breach of covenant claim, and the assertion squarely conflicts with Warnick and Weber 
Basin. The breach of covenant claim was the only claim on which Eggett offered or argued 
evidence of the accounting adjustments, and the only claim on which the jury considered it. 
The Court of Appeals would have construed the jury's answers to sustain the verdict, and 
presumed that the jury found that Wasatch breached the covenant by manipulating the 
suspense account entries, and awarded damages by reversing Wasatch's adjustments in the 
amount of $296,252, to arrive at a book value for Eggett's shares of $135,671.96. 
Further, the Court of Appeals would have properly affirmed admission of the 
accounting adjustments to prove a breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, even 
if the trial court had admitted the adjustments on another ground: 
It is well settled that an appellate court may affirm the judgment appealed from 
if it sustainable on any legal ground or theory apparent on the record, even 
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though such ground or theory differs from that stated by the trial court to be 
the basis of its ruling or action, and this is true if such ground or theory is not 
argued or argued on appeal by appellee, was not raised in the lower court, and 
was not considered or passed on by the lower court, 
Dipoma v. McPhie, 29 P.3d 1225, 1229-30 (Utah 2001) (quotations omitted). In Dipoma, 
this Court reversed the Court of Appeals, because the Court of Appeals did not decide an 
available issue that was not presented to the trial court. That same principle would have 
required the Court of Appeals here to affirm admission of the accounting adjustments, 
whether or not the trial court admitted them to prove the breach of covenant claim.3 
2. Wasatch Has Waived Its Objection that Eggett Did Not Seek Recovery 
for Breach of the Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing. 
In any event, Wasatch has waived its objection that Eggett "did not seek recovery" 
for the breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, because Wasatch never raised 
it before the trial court. Wasatch did not object to the claim in opening or closing, or to the 
jury instruction. Wasatch's motion for directed verdict at the close of evidence argued that 
the unambiguous terms of the Shareholders9 Agreement must be enforced as a matter of law, 
not that Eggett did not "seek recovery" for the breach of covenant claim. (Tr. 908-09.) 
Eggett respectfully submits that Wasatch's trial counsel (who was not retained on 
appeal) did not make these objections, because he knew full well that Eggett sought recovery 
3Wasatch also argues that the trial court admitted the adjustments on "supposed equitable 
principles." The trial court, however, held that Eggett was entitled to present evidence that the 
audited financial statements "may be affected by discretionary calls within the management," should 
'the corporation elect those decisions obviously inconsistent with his benefit." Slip. Op., 1f 25 
(extensively quoting the trial court). The trial court's ruling summarizes Eggett's breach of covenant 
claim. 
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on the breach of covenant claim. Wasatch's failure to object at trial bars Wasatch from 
relying upon it now. "For a question to be considered on appeal, the record must clearly 
show that it was timely presented to the trial court in a manner sufficient to obtain a ruling 
thereon." Franklin Financial v. New Empire Devp. Co., 659 P.2d 1040, 1045 (Utah 1983). 
This Court should enforce this principle here. If Wasatch had objected that Eggett did 
not "seek recovery" for breach of the covenant on the verdict form, the trial court and the 
parties would have had an opportunity to reword the form to satisfy the objection. Indeed, 
the parties would not have agreed to combine both claims for breach of the Shareholders' 
Agreement in one interrogatory. To hear Wasatch "complain now" "smacks of invited 
error," which "precludes judicial review." Miller v. Martineau & Co., 983 P.2d 1107, 1116 
(Utah App. 1999), quoting Parsons v. Barnes, 871 P.2d 516, 520 (Utah 1994). 
D. Wasatch's Authorities from Other Jurisdictions Are Fully Consistent with 
Utah Law Relating to the Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing. 
Finally, Wasatch cites numerous authorities from other jurisdictions to the effect that 
parol evidence is inadmissible to vary the meaning of "book value" in shareholder buy-out 
agreements. (Pet. Br. 13-16.) These authorities are irrelevant, because the accounting 
adjustments were admitted to prove Eggett9 s breach of covenant claim, not to vary the 
contract terms. None of these authorities addresses Utah law relating to the covenant of good 
faith and fair dealing, but all are consistent with it. 
In Crowder Const. Co. v. Kiser, 517 S.E.2d 178 (N.C. App. 1999), the court looked 
at all "circumstances" in holding that the parties did not intend to allow adjustments to 
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audited book value. The court distinguished Miller Machine Co. v. Miller, 293 S.E.2d 622 
(N.C. App. 1982), in which a shareholder presented evidence that a corporation concealed 
assets from its auditors to deprive the shareholder of book value. Id. at 185-6. Crowder held 
that a calculation of book value by an accounting firm "in accordance with the terms of the 
'buy-out' agreement. . . is presumptively correct, in the absence of mathematical error, 
evidence of fraud (such as willful concealment of assets) or evidence of a failure to follow 
generally accepted accounting practices." Id. at 189 (emphasis added). 
Jones v. Harris, 388 P.2d 539 (Wash. 1964), also held that a court should accept 
book accounts when they are kept in accord with accepted accounting practice 
and not with an eve to the advantageous exercise of the "buy-out" option. If 
arbitrary valuations appear in the accounts, the court can then substitute 
amounts determined through correct accounting procedures. 
388 P.2d at 542 (emphasis added). 
Finally, in Sperco v. MS&D Corp., 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 973 (N.D. 111. 1989), the 
court held that a corporation did not breach the covenant of good faith and fair dealing by 
paying net book value pursuant to a shareholder buy-out agreement, rather than fair market 
value. The court specifically distinguished the situation in which the corporation conceals 
actual book value to disadvantage of the shareholder, or in which the shareholder contests 
"specific aspects" of the book value calculation. See 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS at 3-4. 
As in Jones, supra, the accounting adjustments here were admitted to prove that 
Wasatch manipulated the financial statements with an C4with an eye to the advantageous 
exercise of a buy-out agreement." As in Crowder, supra, they were admissible to rebut a 
presumption that Wasatch's audited book value was correct. 
20 
This Court therefore should affirm the Court of Appeals. 
II. THE COURT OF APPEALS CORRECTLY AFFIRMED THE TRIAL 
COURT'S EXERCISE OF DISCRETION IN CLARIFYING THAT $135,671.96 
WAS THE BOOK VALUE OF EGGETTS SHARES. 
A. The Trial Court Has Authority and Discretion to Question Jurors to Clarify an 
Ambiguous Verdict or to Determine if It is Informal or Insufficient. 
Following Utah R. Civ. P. 47(r), and this Court's precedent in Jorgensen v. Gonzales, 
383 P.2d 934 (Utah 1963), the Court of Appeals held that the trial court did not abuse its 
discretion in clarifying the jury's intention and verdict that $135,671.96 was the book value 
of Eggett's shares, and the amount to be awarded to Eggett. Wasatch now argues that Rule 
47(r) "properly applied9' allows only for correction of "patent errors," and does not permit 
a trial court to question jurors to determine if there is patent error, to determine if the verdict 
is informal or insufficient, or to clarify an ambiguous interrogatory answer. Pet. Br. at 25. 
Because the argument conflicts with Jorgensen, and with virtually every other state and 
federal court authority, this Court should reject it. 
1. Jorgensen and Other Utah Authority Authorize a Trial Court to 
Question Jurors to Determine if a Verdict is Informal or Insufficient. 
In Jorgensen, this Court affirmed the authority and discretion of a trial court under 
Rule 47(r) to direct a jury to clarify an informal or insufficient verdict, stating: 
Rule 47(r) U.R.C.P. provides that, "if the verdict . . . is informal or 
insufficient, it may be corrected by the jury under the advice of the court, or 
the jury may be sent out again." In that sense the term "insufficient" means 
inadequate or lacking in some requirement, purpose or use. The general and 
well-established rule is that so long as the jury is functioning as such in the 
course of the trial and until it is discharged, it is subject to directions and 
instructions from the court to the end that the issues be fully tried, deliberated 
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upon and a correct verdict rendered. And where it is apparent that there is 
some patent error in connection with the verdict, the court may of course call 
the matter to their attention and direct them to redeliberate. In that regard it 
has been held, sensibly and properly, that where an amount is erroneously 
included the court may direct the jury to retire and correct it. The trial court 
appears to have acted not only within its prerogative but properly and 
discreetly in handling the situation. 
383 P.2d at 935, quoting Crowe v. Sacks, 283 P.2d 689 (Cal. 1955) (en banc). 
Wasatch's assertion that Rule 47(r) applies only to "patent" error rests almost 
completely on the reference to "patent" error in this quotation. Wasatch extrapolates that if 
Rule 47(r) applies only to "patent" errors, a trial court cannot question jurors to determine 
if there is a patent error, to determine if an interrogatory answer is informal or insufficient, 
or to clarify an ambiguity. Jorgensen itself squarely contradicts the extrapolation. 
In the first place, the very sentence quoted by Wasatch authorizes a trial court to 
clarify a verdict in instances of ambiguity or uncertainty - "where it is apparent that there 
is some patent error in connection with the verdict" (emphasis added). Further, Jorgensen 
affirms a trial court's discretion to confirm the "possibility" that a verdict is informal or 
insufficient. In Jorgensen, the verdict in a personal injury action included "odd amounts." 
The verdict was within the range argued by the parties, and was regular on its face; in a 
word, any informality or insufficiency was no more or less "patent" than the jury's answer 
to Question 5 here. Nonetheless, the "odd amounts" prompted the trial court 
to question the jury foreman about the possibility of a quotient or chance 
verdict. In connection with this questioning it came out that the jury had 
considered as one aspect of plaintiffs general damages, her travel expense 
from California to Utah. Defendant asserted this was a matter improper to 
consider, which was conceded by the plaintiff, and the court directed the jury 
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to go out and reconsider its verdict. They did so and returned with a 
second verdict.... 
383 P.2d at 935 (emphasis added). 
Wasatch's assertion that the error in Jorgensen was "patent," but the error here was 
not, is simply semantics. Once the jury foreman said that $135,671.96 was the book value 
of Eggett's shares, not the book value of Wasatch, the error was patent, because the written 
answer did not reflect the understanding, agreement, or intention of the jury. The important 
point is that Jorgensen held that a trial court has discretion and authority to question the jury 
to confirm an "apparent" or "possible" error, and acted "properly and discretely in doing so." 
Wasatch's assertion that "subsequent Utah cases" have limited Rule 47(r) to "patent 
error in a verdict," (Pet. Br. 26), reads too much into those cases. In Baker v. Cook, 308 P.2d 
264, 265-66 (Utah 1957), this Court approved the trial court's questions to determine the 
meaning of an interrogatory answer that the jury was "unable to say" whether a party was 
negligent. By asking questions, the trial court determined that the jurors meant that they 
were "unable to say" that a party was negligent, based on a preponderance of the evidence, 
not that they were confused or deadlocked. This Court affirmed, noting that the trial 
court's questioning of the jury respecting their answers adroitly led them to the 
conclusion that they were not confused by the propositions, but were merely 
unconvinced by the evidence. 
We are unable to see from a reading of the record wherein defendant was 
prejudiced by the [interrogatory] questions; particularly is the fact emphasized 
by the examination of the jurors after their verdict had been returned. 
308 P.2d at 266 (emphasis added). 
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In Bennion v. LeGrand Johnson Const Co., 701 P.2d 1078 (Utah 1985), this Court 
held that a party must object before a jury is discharged if the verdict is ambiguous, to give 
the trial court and the jury the opportunity to clarify the ambiguity: 
When special interrogatories or verdicts are ambiguous, counsel has an 
obligation either to object to the filing of the verdict or to move that the cause 
be resubmitted to the jury for clarification. If a party fails to take appropriate 
action before the discharge of the verdict, that party generally may not later 
move for a new trial on the ground that the verdict was defective. The rule 
does not apply when a verdict is so ambiguous, contradictory or illogical that 
it does not clearly indicate for whom a verdict is rendered, and the verdict 
would leave the Court in a position of having no alternative but to guess at 
what the jury intended. The rule requiring an objection if there is some 
ambiguity serves the objective of avoiding the expense and additional time for 
a new trial by having the jury which heard the facts clarify the ambiguity while 
it is able to do so. 
Id. at 1083. See also, Wright v. Westside Nursery, 787 P.2d 508, 516 (Utah App. 1990) 
(affirming trial court's questioning jurors to clarify ambiguities in interrogatory answers).4 
In summary, these Utah authorities contradict Wasatch's assertion that Rule 47(r) 
applies only to "patent" error and prohibits a trial court from questioning jurors to determine 
if there is "patent" error, or to resolve an informality, insufficiency, or ambiguity. 
2. Many Other Court Decisions Confirm that a Trial Court Can Question 
Jurors to Clarify Informal or Insufficient Verdicts, and that the Jury's 
Answer to Question 5 Was Both Informal and Insufficient. 
In Jorgensen, this Court defined "insufficient" as "inadequate or lacking in some 
4Wasatch also cites Brown v. Johnson, 472 P.2d 942 (Utah 1970), Langton v. Intl. 
Transport, Inc., 491 P.2d 1211 (Utah 1971), and Stevenett v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 977 P.2d 308 
(Utah App. 1999). See Pet. Br. at 26-27. None of these decisions even addresses the issue raised 
by Wasatch, much less support its assertion that Rule 47(r) applies only to "patent" errors, or that 
a trial court cannot question jurors to resolve an informality, insufficiency, or ambiguity. 
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requirement, purpose or use." 383 P.2d at 935, quoting Crowe v. Sacks, 283 P.2d 689 (Cal. 
1955) (en banc). In Crowe, the California Supreme Court defined "informal" or 
"insufficient" under Rule 619 of the California Civil Code, the equivalent of Rule 47(r): 
"Informal" is defined as "defective in form; not in the usual form or 
manner; contrary to custom or prescribed rule." "Insufficient" is defined as 
"inadequate for some need, purpose or use." A verdict must comprehend all 
the issues submitted to the jury. A verdict which goes beyond the issues of the 
case as stated in the instructions on the law given bv the court to the jury, is 
not in conformity with the instructions and is therefore "insufficient." 
283 P.2d at 692-93 (emphasis added). 
As defined mJorgensen and Crowe, the jury's answer to Question 5 was informal and 
insufficient. The issue facing the trial court was whether the jury answered one question 
while the interrogatory asked another. If the jury calculated the book value of Eggett's 
shares but was asked to calculate the book value of Wasatch, that discrepancy goes to the 
form and sufficiency of the verdict - not, as Wasatch asserts, to the sufficiency of the 
evidence. The jury's answer was informal because it did not correspond to the form of the 
question; it was insufficient because it did not comprehend the issue framed by the question. 
See also, Langton v. Int'l. Transport, Inc., 491 P.2d 1211,1214 (Utah 1971) (because jury 
verdict "was defective in form in that it did not comprehend all the items of damage 
contained in the instructions given by the court, it was therefore insufficient"). 
California decisions before and after Crowe confirm that the jury's answer here was 
informal and insufficient, and that a trial court has authority and discretion to clarify an 
ambiguous verdict. In Woodcock v. Fontana Scaffolding & Equip. Co., 445 P.2d 881 (Cal. 
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1968) (en banc), the California Supreme Court held that a trial court had discretion under 
Section 619 to clarify an ambiguity as to whether the jury calculated gross or net damages: 
Standing alone, the verdict is ambiguous in not specifying whether the $ 13.000 
represents the gross or net amount of damages. If the verdict is ambiguous the 
party adversely affected should request a more formal and certain verdict. 
Then, if the trial judge has any doubts on the subject, he may send the jury out, 
under proper instructions, to correct the informal or insufficient verdict. 
445 P.2d at 884. Accord, Mizel v. City of Santa Monica, 113 Cal. Rptr.2d 649, 657 (Cal. 
App. 2001) ("[w]hen a jury renders an informal or insufficient verdict not covering the issue 
submitted, the trial court may direct the jury to deliberate further to correct any ambiguity'9): 
Mendoza v. Club Car, Inc., 96 CaL Rptr.2d 605,616 (Cal. App. 2000) (court has discretion 
and power under Section 619 if the verdict is "not inconsistent, but only ambiguous") (all 
emphases added). 
The California appellate courts have repeatedly affirmed a trial court's discretion to 
question jurors (or to rely on their statements), to resolve informality, insufficiency, or 
ambiguity. In Crowe, the jury had found defendants liable to plaintiffs, but made no award 
for pain and suffering. In response to the trial court's question, a juror said that it was a 
"compromise verdict." 283 P.2d at 692. The California Supreme Court held that, because 
"this fact was admitted by a juror," the trial court had discretion to require further 
deliberation and to "instruct the jury that its determination upon the issues should not be 
based upon a compromise." Id. at 693 (but finding that the trial court improperly commented 
on the sufficiency of the evidence). 
Similarly, in Mendoza, supra, the trial court directed the jury to deliberate further to 
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resolve inconsistent interrogatory answers. The trial court asked, "Does the jury foreperson 
understand what I am talking about?" The foreperson said, "I understand. Our interpretation 
of the question was different. Yes." The Court of Appeal held that this statement showed 
that the jury misunderstood the verdict form, rendering its answer informal or insufficient 
because it "did not reflect the jury's intent." The trial court was entitled to rely on "this 
evidence as a concurrent statement by the jury explaining its verdict." Id. at 615. 
The California Court of Appeal also relied on a concurrent juror statement in Mizel, 
supra. The trial court directed the jury to redeliberate to resolve inconsistent interrogatory 
answers. When the jury returned, the foreperson said that the jury had "misunderstood" one 
of the interrogatories. The Court of Appeal rejected the same argument that Wasatch makes 
here-that the trial court had no authority to clarify the verdict simply because it "concludes 
that the damage award was inadequate," but was required to order a new trial. Id. at 658. 
The Court of Appeal emphasized: 
If the jury renders an inconsistent or ambiguous verdict, it is prudent, 
economical, and judicious to provide that jury with an opportunity to correct 
those inconsistencies before it is discharged. 
• • • • 
Defendants' proposal would deprive the jury of the opportunity of clarifying 
its position and in rendering a verdict consistent with its intent. Hence, it is 
appropriate for trial courts to re-instruct the jury in an objective, neutral, and 
noncoercive manner if a jury's simple misunderstanding as to the verdict 
forms, or a clerical error can be corrected. In such situations, trial courts are 
warranted in ascertaining if further instruction would assist the jury in 
correcting a conceptual misunderstanding, and in providing such instruction 
if the jury so requests. These simple actions by the trial court are a proper 
exercise of its power. 
Id. at 658-59 (emphasis added). 
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These California decisions confirm that a verdict is informal or insufficient if the jury 
misunderstands the verdict form or the court's instructions, or if the written answer does not 
accurately express the agreement or intention of the jury. These decisions also confirm that 
a trial court can question jurors to determine whether the answer is informal and insufficient. 
Many courts in other states have reached the same conclusion, and all are consistent 
with Utah law as stated in Jorgensen.5 
3. Romano. Unit Drilling, and Resolution Trust Provide Persuasive 
Reasoning That a Trial Court Can Question Jurors to Clarify a Verdict. 
The Court of Appeals here quoted extensively from three federal Courts of Appeals 
decisions whose reasoning was "persuasive," Romano v. U-HaulIntern., Inc., 233 F.3d 655 
(1st Cir. 2000), cert, denied, 122 S.Ct 41 (2001), Unit Drilling Co. v. Enron Oil & Gas Co., 
108 F.3d 1186 (10th Cir. 1997), and Resolution Trust Corp. v. Stow, 998 F.2d 1534(10thCir. 
5See, e.g., Smith v. S.& F. Const. Co., 383 P.2d 300, 301 (Wash. 1963)("A trial court is justified in 
making such inquiry of jurors as to enable it to understand their will and intention, and their answers to such 
inquiry will be looked upon as an aid in the rendering of a proper judgment."); Baldwin v. Ewing, 204 P.2d 
430,432 (Ida. 1949) ("If either the court or counsel considered [the verdict] uncertain, the proper procedure 
would have been to have refused to accept the verdict and require the jury to correct it. Such procedure is quite 
universally authorized"); Nails v. S&R, Inc., 639 A.2d 660, 667 (Md. 1994) ("after a jury has rendered an 
initial verdict, the trial judge ordinarily may ask the jury to amend, clarify or supplement the verdict in order 
to resolve an ambiguity, inconsistency, incompleteness, or similar problem with the initial verdict, up until the 
jury has been discharged and has left the court room"); Dias v. Vanek, 679 P.2d 133, 136 (Hawaii 1984) 
("The preferred remedy of an ambiguous verdict is to have the jurors return to clarify the verdict."); Standard 
Oil Co. v Gonser, 49 N.W.2d 45,48 (Mich. 1951) ("inquiries of the jurors in court, and amendments for the 
purpose of putting in due form what the jury mean by their finding, are unobjectionable"); Pinholster v. 
McGinnis, 271 S.E.2d 722, 723 (Ga. App. 1980) ("A verdict may be amended in substance before the jury 
disperses so as to express the true finding of the jury.")(afFirming trial court's questioning jurors to determine 
their true verdict); St. Francis Med. Or. v. Sheffer, 892 S.W.2d 394, 396 (Mo. App. 1995X"If a verdict is 
found to be ambiguous, inconsistent, or otherwise defective, the jury should be given the opportunity to correct 
the verdict or to find a new one before such verdict is recorded and made part of the judgment. A verdict is not 
final until the jury decision is submitted to the court, accepted by it and assented to by the jury, and recorded 
by the court. This procedure guarantees the jury ample opportunity to correct any defects and misunderstanding 
as to the verdict."). 
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1993). (Slip Op., 1129-32). The Court of Appeals stated: 
we agree with the rationale set forth in both Romano and Unit Drilling that 
permitting the trial court to question the jury regarding an ambiguous verdict 
promotes judicial economy and alleviates the need for a new trial when a 
simple inquiry may cure the ambiguity. Indeed, we commend the trial judge's 
thoroughness and attention to detail. Trial judges, when faced with similar 
situations, should have the latitude to ask questions in order to determine the 
true verdict of the jury. (Slip Op., f 29). 
Wasatch makes no real attempt to explain why the "persuasive reasoning" of these 
decisions should not apply here. Wasatch relegates them to a footnote, distinguishing them 
because they were decided under Fed. R. Civ. P. 49. Wasatch further distinguishes Unit 
Drilling on the ground that a party requested clarification, while the trial court here acted sua 
sponte, and distinguishes Romano on the ground that it involved 4<true patent error." (Pet. 
Br.29 n. 4.) None of these distinctions matters. 
Unit Drilling and Resolution Trust leave no doubt that a trial court has discretion to 
question jurors to clarify an ambiguous verdict, particularly where the ambiguity relates to 
whether or not the jury performed a certain calculation. In Unit Drilling, the jury awarded 
plaintiff $70,768.02 in answer to one interrogatory, and awarded defendant a set-off of 
$86,494.30, in answer to another. The ambiguity was whether or not the jury had calculated 
the set-off in awarding $70,768.02. Plaintiff asserted that the jury had calculated the set-off, 
and that $70,768.02 was a net award. The trial court, however, refused plaintiffs request 
to have the jury clarify its verdict, and set-off the $86,494.30 against the $70,768.02, 
resulting in no award. See 108 F.3d at 1190. 
There is no meaningful distinction between the jury's answer in Unit Drilling and the 
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jury's answer here: Whether the jury calculated a set-off in Unit Drilling is no more or less 
patent, and no more or less ambiguous, than whether the jury calculated the book value of 
Eggett's shares. The Tenth Circuit held that 'Vhether the jury intended [plaintiff] to receive 
a judgment of $70,768.02, or, as the trial court found, nothing, was at the very least 
ambiguous." Id. Consequently, the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to question 
the jury to clarify its answer: 
When a party objects to a trial court's interpretation of a verdict before 
the jury is discharged, as [plaintiff] did here, the district court should make a 
fair appraisal of the whole record to discern whether the verdict is, in fact, 
ambiguous. In this case, potentially misleading jury instructions and forms 
and the susceptibility of the verdict to an interpretation other than the one 
arrived at by the district court, given the facts of the case, point to an 
ambiguity in the verdict. Only by asking the jury to clarify its verdict could 
the court have determined the jury's 'true decision." Parties who entrust the 
resolution of their disputes to the legal system are entitled to no less. 
A/, at 1191. In language echoing this Court in Jorgensen and Bennion, supra, the Tenth 
Circuit added that, in civil cases, "it is generally agreed that a trial judge has the authority, 
even the duty, to direct or permit a jury to correct or reconsider a defective verdict at any 
time before the jury has been discharged." Id. 
The jury's answers in Resolution Trust, supra, were no more or less patent or 
ambiguous than the jury's answer here, either. The jury returned separate damages awards 
on seven different counts, rather than one lump sum damage award. The ambiguity was 
whether the jury intended "all of the damage awards to be added together to determine total 
liability," or whether the total liability" was the "largest damage award under a single count." 
998 F.2d at 1534. The trial court questioned the foreman, who answered that the jury 
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intended the verdicts to be aggregated to determine total liability. Id. at 1535. The Tenth 
Circuit affirmed the questioning of the foreman to clarify the verdict: 
We have previously suggested that a district court may question jurors 
to confirm their understanding of the verdict. In Eastridge Dev. Co. v. Halpert 
Assoc, Inc., 853 F.2d 772 (10th Cir. 1988), the district court had questioned 
jurors about what they understood their verdict to mean. We affirmed the 
district court's decision to amend the verdict to reflect the jury's 'true 
decision." Implicit in our decision in Eastridge is the notion that it is proper 
to question jurors to determine what that 'true decision" is. 
998 F.2d at 1534 (emphasis added; citation omitted). 
Wasatch's attempt to distinguish Romano because it involved 'true patent error," finds 
no support in Romano itself. The First Circuit's decision, affirming the trial court's exercise 
of its "considerable discretion" in resubmitting interrogatories, makes no mention of "patent" 
error, or anything like it. In fact, the First Circuit noted that the trial court could have 
"surmised" that the jury "confused" nominal and general damages in making its award. See 
233 F.3d at 670-71. The First Circuit relied on numerous decisions, all affirming a trial 
court's broad discretion to clarify an ambiguous verdict, and to question a jury in doing so.6 
As the Court of Appeals noted here, the rule of decision in these federal cases, 
permitting a trial court to question jurors to clarify an ambiguous verdict, promotes judicial 
6
 See 233 F.3d at 671, citing Atlantic Tubing & Rubber Co. v. Intl. Engraving Co., 528 
F.2d 1272, 1275 (1st Cir. 1975) (affirming resubmission where initial answers were either 
"inconsistent or ambiguous"): Poduska v. Ward, 895 F.2d 854,857 (1st Cir. 1990) (court's questions 
to jurors and instructions to redeliberate "afforded the jury a timely opportunity to straighten out both 
apparent and possible mistakes"): Smith v. RicelandFoods, Inc., 151 F.3d 813, 821 (8th Cir. 1998) 
("A district court has discretion to decide a jury's findings on a verdict form are incomplete, 
confusing, or inconsistent and whether to resubmit the claim to the jury.") (all emphases added). 
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economy and ensures that the jury renders its true verdict. There can be no reason why this 
principle should govern Fed. R. Civ. P. 49 (or Utah R. Civ. P. 49, since federal courts often 
provide the rule of decision for the corresponding state rule), but not Utah Rule 47(r). 
4. The Court of Appeals Opinion Is Consistent with Utah Law Permitting 
Jurors to Testify After Discharge to Clarify Their Verdict. 
Finally, there can be no doubt that a trial court has discretion to question jurors before 
they are discharged, because Utah law permits jurors to testify after discharge to clarify or 
explain their verdict. This Court stated long ago that, while "jurors may not by affidavit or 
otherwise impeach their verdict, they may give proof to explain it." Brown v. Johnson, All 
P.2d 942, 946 n. 1 (Utah 1970) (emphasis in original). This Court added: 
The general rule, that the statements of jurors will not be received to establish 
their own misconduct, or to impeach their verdict, does not prevent the 
reception of their evidence as to what really was the verdict agreed on, in order 
to prove that, through mistake or otherwise, it has not been correctly 
expressed, as the agreement reached by the jury, and not the written paper 
filed, is the verdict; and a showing that the writing is incorrect is not an 
impeachment of the verdict itself. 
Affidavits of jurors are admissible to show that the verdict, as received and 
entered of record, by reason of a mistake, does not embody the true finding of 
the jury. 
Id., quoting Moulton v. Staats, 27 P.2d 455, 459 (Utah 1933). 
Utah law is consistent with the vast majority of other jurisdictions, and with Wigmore 
and Weinstein. According to Wigmore, 
When the verdict as announced or delivered is different-and all of the 
jurors agree that it is different-from the verdict as assented to in the jury room 
at the time of voting . . . such a verdict may be corrected to represent the 
verdict actually agreed upon by the jury as a whole. 
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8 Wigmore, Evidence § 2355. Accord, 3 Weinstein 's Federal Evidence %606[04] at 606-32 
(1981 ed.) (Fed. R. Civ. P. 606(b) "does not bar testimony by a juror that all jurors agree that 
through inadvertence, oversight, or mistake the verdict announced was not the verdict on 
which agreement had been reached"). 
Decisions from the Tenth Circuit and the Second Circuit have affirmed juror 
testimony after discharge to explain that they calculated a plaintiffs comparative fault, and 
awarded net damages. In Eastridge Devp. Co. v. Halpert Assoc, Inc., 853 F.2d 772 (10th 
Cir. 1988), the jury found plaintiff damaged in the amount of $208,000, and also 20% at fault 
(for an award of $166,400). After discharge, plaintiffs counsel submitted an affidavit from 
the jury foreman stating that the $208,000 included a deduction for plaintiffs comparative 
fault, and was the amount the jury intended to award. Based on the affidavit, the trial court 
amended the verdict to award $208,000. The Tenth Circuit upheld the amendment, stating: 
[Fed. R. Civ. P.] 606(b) did not preclude the court from interrogating the jury 
concerning its verdict for the possibility of discovering clerical errors, and the 
Rule did not prevent a juror from testifying that the verdict did not accurately 
reflect the decision of the jury. 
853 F.2d at 783 (emphasis added). 
The Second Circuit affirmed the same procedure mAttridge v. Cencorp Div. of Dover 
Tech. Int'L, Inc., 836 F.2d 113(2d Cir. 1987). After discharge, the foreman told the trial court 
that the jury had calculated plaintiffs' comparative fault. The trial court interviewed each 
juror to determine "whether the announced verdict reflected their true intent." When all 
jurors confirmed the foreman's statement, the trial court amended the verdict. See 836 F.2d 
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at 115. Noting that Rule 606(b) does not bar "juror testimony on the veracity of a verdict," 
the Second Circuit held that "juror interviews were proper because they were designed to 
ascertain what the jury decided and not why they did so." Id. at 116,117 (emphasis added). 
Significantly, the prohibitions on juror testimony after discharge do not apply to juror 
questioning by the court before discharge: 
The restrictions in rule 606(b) apply only to inquiry after the verdict or 
indictment has been reached, or after a partial verdict has been recorded. They do not 
operate to bar a judge from questioning a jury that returns an ambiguous or 
inconsistent verdict. As Wigmore states, "The reasons for the foregoing rule, namely, 
the dangers of uncertainty and of tampering with the jurors to procure testimony, 
disappear in large part if such investigation as may be desired is made by the judge 
and takes place before the jurors' discharge and separation." 
3 Weinstein's Federal Evidence, §606.04[2][b] at 606-17,18, quoting8 Wigmore, Evidence, 
§ 2350 at 691 (McNaughton ed. 1961) (emphasis added). 
Thus, the scope of a trial court's authority and discretion to question jurors before 
discharge is much broader than it is after discharge. The point here is that if the trial courts 
in Eastridge and Attridge, supra, could properly question jurors after discharge about 
whether they calculated a plaintiffs comparative fault, the trial court here could question 
jurors before discharge about whether they calculated the book value of Eggett's shares. If 
the trial court had not clarified the jury verdict before discharge, Eggett would have been 
fully entitled under Brown v. Johnson, supra, to present juror affidavits after discharge 
explaining what their verdict was: They had agreed to award Eggett $ 135,671.96 as the book 
value of his shares, and the verdict as entered was not the verdict agreed upon in the jury 
room. The trial court would have been fully entitled to amend the verdict accordingly. 
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It makes no sense to preclude a trial court from questioning jurors to determine what 
their verdict was, under the guise that Rule 47(r) applies only to "patent" error. Indeed, if 
Rule 47(r) applied only to "patent" error as Wasatch defines it, a trial court could never 
question a juror, because there is no need to question jurors if the error is truly patent. 
B. The Court of Appeals Correctly Held that the Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its 
Discretion in Clarifying the Jury's Intention and Verdict. 
The Court of Appeals concluded that the trial court neither "forced nor coerced the 
jury to alter its verdict," did "not take the decision-making role away from the jury," but 
"gave the jury the opportunity to render a proper verdict," and "properly exercised its 
discretion." (Slip Op. ^f 39,40.) Wasatch disagrees, arguing that the trial court coerced the 
jury to change its true verdict to suit its view of the evidence. (Pet. Br. 28 n. 3.) 
This Court should reject the arguments. 
1. The Jury's Answer to Question 5 Is Not Its Verdict and the Trial Court 
Did not Set the Verdict Aside. 
Wasatch's assertion that the trial court set aside the jury's verdict rests on a 
fundamental misconception. As this Court has stated, "the agreement reached by the jury, 
and not the written paper filed, is the verdict; and a showing that the writing is incorrect is 
not an impeachment of the verdict itself." Brown v. Johnson, supra, All P.2d at 946 n. 1. 
Accord, Crowe v. Sacks, supra, 283 P.2d at 694 (interrogatory answer is not a verdict until 
it is received and entered as the verdict of the jury). Moreover, because a "verdict is not final 
until received by the court, it follows that [a] poll of jurors" in open court "is tantamount to 
a final vote." Butler v. State, 663 P.2d 1390,1392 (Wash. App. 1983). 
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Thus, the jury's written answer to Question 5 is not its verdict; its verdict is either (1) 
the agreement reached in the jury room, as reported by the jury foreman, calculating the book 
value of Eggett's shares; or (2) the jurors' unanimous answers to the trial court's question 
in open court, as received and entered by the trial court. 
Wasatch cites many Utah cases stating the standard for setting aside a jury verdict 
under Rules 50 and 59, after the verdict has been received and the jury discharged. All of 
these decisions 7 are irrelevant, because the trial court did not "set aside" the jury's verdict. 
The trial court did not make its "own assessment of the evidence," did not "make findings 
inconsistent with the jury's findings" (or any finding at all), and did not conclude that the 
'Verdict awarded inadequate damages." (Pet. Br. 28-29.) Nor did the trial court grant a jnov 
or a new trial. Wasatch's invocation of the "inviolability" of a jury verdict, is merely 
rhetorical. The trial court preserved the jury verdict by giving the jury the opportunity to 
clarify it, and ensuring that its "true verdict" was received and recorded. 
2. The Trial Court Properly Exercised Its Discretion in Concluding That 
the Jury's Written Answer May Have Been a Mistake. 
The trial court found that Question No. 5 was "confusing" and "ambiguous" (Tr. 990, 
7See Goddardv. Hickman, 685 P.2d 530, 532 (Utah 1984) (upholding court's discretion in 
granting a new trial); Groen v. Tri-O-Inc, 667 P2d 598, 601 (Utah 1983) (affirming denial of jnov 
and new trial motions); Ute-Cal Land Devp. Corp. v. Sather, 605 P.2d 1240, 1248 (Utah 1980); 
Brigham v. Moon Lake Elec. Ass'n, 470 P.2d (1970) (denial of new trial); First Security Bank v. 
Ezra C. Luhndahl, Inc., 454 P.2d 886,889 (Utah 1969) (trial judge made an additional finding of feet 
that was inherently inconsistent with the jury's findings); EFCO Distributing Inc. v. Perrin, 412 P.2d 
615,617 (Utah 1966) (upholding denial of motions for jnov and new trial); Baker v. Cook, 308 P.2d 
264, 266 (Utah 1957) (affirming trial court's refusal to declare mistrial); Stevenett v. Wal-Mart 
Stores, Inc., 977 P.2d 508 (Utah App. 1999). 
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993), and that the jury's answer may have been a "mistake" (Tr. 990.) Wasatch disputes 
these findings (without acknowledging that they are reviewable only for abuse of discretion), 
because the answer is a "single number written in the blank space." (Pet. Br. 27.) 
Whether an answer is informal, insufficient, ambiguous, or a "mistake," however, 
turns on all surrounding facts and circumstances. As the Tenth Circuit held in Unit Drilling, 
a trial court has a duty to determine if the verdict is "ambiguous," from the "whole 
record,"including "potentially misleading jury instructions and forms and the susceptibility 
of the verdict" to a different interpretation. See 108 F.3d at 1191. Accord, Sherwood v. 
Rossini, 71 Cal. App. 1, 4 n. 1 (Cal App. 1968) (to determine if the verdict is informal or 
insufficient, "reference may be made to the entire record, including the pleadings, the 
evidence and the court's instructions"). If the court has "any doubts,"it may ask the jury "to 
correct the informal or insufficient verdict." Woodcock, supra, 445 P.2d at 882. 
The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's exercise of discretion to question 
jurors, because the trial court could have surmised "that there was some patent error in 
connection with the verdict." (Slip Op., f 35, quoting Jorgensen.) The Court of Appeals 
discussed at length one fact supporting the trial court's discretion: the figure of $135,671.96 
did not correspond to either party's calculation of Wasatch's book value. As Wasatch argues 
(Pet. Br. 23),Wasatch presented evidence that its book value was $75,452, and the book 
value of Eggett's shares was $27,540. Eggett presented evidence that, if the jury found that 
Wasatch made all of the accounting adjustments in bad faith to reduce the book value of 
Eggett's shares, the book value of Wasatch would be $669,778, and the book value of 
37 
Eggett's shares would be $255,419. If the jury found that Wasatch made some, but not all, 
of the adjustments in bad faith, the value of Eggett's shares would be less than $255,419. 
The Court of Appeals concluded that the trial court, based on its "familiarity with the 
figures argued during four days of trial," most likely realized that the jury included "a portion 
of the adjustments" and calculated the book value of Eggett's shares. (Slip. Op., f^ 37). 
Indeed, neither Wasatch nor Eggett presented any evidence or figures from which the jury 
could calculate the book value of Wasatch to be $135,671.96, or a figure close to it. If the 
jury, however, made just one of Eggett's requested adjustments ($296,252 for the suspense 
account), the book value of Eggett's shares would be exactly $135,671.96. {Id.)* 
Wasatch argues that the trial court did not mention the suspense account adjustment 
when it told counsel after discharge (Tr. 995) that $135,671.96 would have been "irrationally 
selected" if it were the book value of Wasatch. Whether the trial court actually calculated 
the book value of Eggett's shares with the suspense account adjustment, however, is not the 
point. The trial court reasonably knew that $135,671.96 did not correspond to any 
calculation of Wasatch's book value, and that the jury could have calculated that number 
only by calculating the value of Eggett's shares. If the trial court had "any doubts," the trial 
court had a duty to ask for clarification. Woodcock, supra, 445 P.2d at 882. The Court of 
8Wasatch argues that the Court of Appeals incorrectly summarized each party's calculation 
of book value. Pet. Br. at 23. The correct figures, however, affirm the Court of Appeals' conclusion. 
Because Wasatch argued that the book value of Wasatch was $74,452, not $133,155, there was no 
evidence from which the jury could calculate the book value of Wasatch to be $135,671.96, or a 
figure close to it. The trial court was fully entitled to conclude in its discretion that the jury may have 
calculated the book value of Eggett's shares, and ask for clarification. 
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Appeals properly affirmed this exercise of discretion, because it could not find that "no 
reasonable person would take the view adopted by the trial court." Brewer v. Denver & Rio 
Grande Western R.R., 31 P.3d 557, 563 (Utah 2001). 
In addition, all of the other facts and circumstances throughout the proceedings would 
have led the trial court to conclude in its discretion that the jury may have calculated the 
value of Eggett's shares. Both counsel in opening argument told the jury that it would be 
asked to determine the book value of Eggett's shares. (Tr. 69, 78, 81.) Wasatch's trial 
counsel told the jury that it would have to decide two issues: 
One is what is he supposed to get for his stock. At the time he quit he owned 
36.5% of the stock, a little more than a third of the company and there's a 
contract that talks about what he's supposed to get and you're going to have 
to decide the issues with regard to that. (Tr. 78) (emphasis added). 
Eggett's damage evidence and testimony showed the jury how to calculate the book 
value of Eggett's shares. (Tr. 282-88, 894.) Wasatch' assertion that the evidence showed 
the jury how to calculate the book value of Wasatch ( Pet. Br. 8), is simply wrong. The 
exhibit that Wasatch appends to its brief shows that Eggett testified to, and showed the jury 
how to calculate, the book value of his shares at $255,419. (Pet. Br. Add 50.) Eggett's 
counsel asked the jury to award him book value for his shares in closing. (Tr. 954, 976.) 
Further, all the other interrogatories asked the jury to determine the amount to be 
awarded to Eggett (or to Wasatch on its counterclaims). (Pet. Br. Add. 7-9.) The jury was 
not told that the court or the parties would calculate the value of Eggett's shares once the jury 
determined the value of Wasatch. Neither the parties or the trial court ever discussed, much 
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less showed a "clear intent" (Pet. Br. 8), that the parties would calculate the value of Eggett's 
shares after the jury calculated the value of Wasatch. Wasatch's assertion (id.), that the 
parties intended to "avoid computational error" and "spare" the jury this relatively simple 
task (multiplying the book value of Wasatch by 36.5%) flies in the face of much more 
complex calculations the jury was to perform to determine the book value of Wasatch, 
additional compensation owed Eggett, or amounts owed Wasatch on its counterclaims. 
In summary, the Court of Appeals properly respected the trial court's discretion to 
determine if the jury's answer to Question 5 was informal or insufficient, and to ask the jury 
to clarify it. Wasatch now attempts to circumvent this standard of review by couching its 
appeal as interpretation of a rule of civil procedure. Pet. Br. at 1. In effect, however, 
Wasatch asked the Court of Appeals and now this Court to second-guess the trial court's 
findings, based on all the facts and circumstances at trial, that the question and answer were 
ambiguous, confusing, and perhaps a "mistake." The trial court, however, 
[which] has observed the jury during the trial, prepared the questions and 
explained them to the jury, is in the best position to determine whether the 
answers reflect confusion or uncertainty. The judge also is in an excellent 
position to evaluate whether the jury will likely be able to resolve this 
uncertainty with proper guidance. 
Richard v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 853 F.2d 1258, 1260 (5th Cir. 1988). 
3. The Court of Appeals Correctly Concluded that the Trial Court Did Not 
Coerce the Jury, or Take Awav Its Decision-Making Authority. 
Wasatch characterizes the trial court's questioning of the jury as a "blatant attempt" 
to "control the verdict," and asserts that the court "coerced the jury to accept and follow his 
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view of the evidence, or at least created enough uncertainty to allow his own inference of 
jury intent to supplant the true verdict." (Pet. Br. 28 n. 3) (emphasis in original). 
Wasatch's assertion rests on a distortion of the record. Wasatch misquotes the 
foreman's answer to the trial court's first question. Wasatch quotes the answer as "We 
believe that to be book value." (Pet. Br. 27.) Wasatch omits and does not bring to this 
Court's attention all of the answer: 
Do I understand, Mr. Robertson, that the jury's decision, as I've read 
this question number five, is this the value that the jury believes should be paid 
for the shares? 
MR. ROBERTSON: We believe that to be the book value. 
THE COURT: And so-
MR. ROBERTSON: Paid for the shares. 
THE COURT: So from the, I think the question was confusing and 
that's why I wanted to ask that question 
(Tr. 989-90) (emphasis added). 
Thus, the jury foreman answered that $135,671.96 was the amount to be paid for the 
shares before the trial court stated that Question 5 was "confusing," before Wasatch objected, 
and before the court stated that it would not allow the answer to stand "if it is a mistake." 
The foreman's first answer destroys Wasatch's inherently implausible assertion that the trial 
court's comments coerced the jury foreman and then all jurors to change their answers to 
comply with the trial court's view of the evidence. 
In any event, it is inherently implausible that the court's comments caused all jurors 
to change their "true verdict." The court simply stated that it thought the "question was 
confusing," and invited the foreman to clarify the confusion, phrasing the problem in the 
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subjunctive: "I'm not going to allow that to stand if it is a mistake. So, if I can find that out 
now, I will find that out now." Id. (emphasis added). The court did not, as Wasatch distorts 
the record, tell the jury that its answer was a mistake. (Pet. Br. 8, 27.) 
Nor did the trial court coerce the jurors when it polled them. Immediately after the 
foreman's second answer, the court addressed the jury in the subjunctive: "All right. Now 
I'm going to ask that question of all of you as jurors if you concur in that determination." Id. 
The court said that it "just wantjed]" to explain "the problem" to "get a clear understanding 
of what your decision is," and asked the jurors to state 'If any of you disagree": 
We know from the facts of this case that Mr. Eggett owns 36.5 percent 
[of Wasatch's shares]. If I interpret your answer to this question to be 
$ 135,000.00 for book value, [sic] That would mean that he would be entitled 
to 36.5 percent of $135,000. If I understand it the way I have now asked 
you the question, he is entitled to $135,671.96 which is a number that you 
have come to by some calculation method for the purchase of his shares of 
stock. So, in other words, this figure, 135,000, is a representative figure due 
to him which represents 36 percent of x which is a larger number. All right? 
Now, I want to be sure that I understand that correctly and if any of you 
disagree with that, I want to know that. 
Id. at 991-92 (all emphases added). Every juror answered "yes-" Id- a t 992. 
Contrary to Wasatch's assertion that the polling question was; confusing (Pet Br. 31), 
everyone in the courtroom understood it and the jurors' answers. Each juror answered the 
same question that the trial court had just asked the foreman twice, and which the trial court 
had just told the jurors "[n]ow I'm going to ask that question of all of you." That is why the 
court entered judgment of $135,671.96, as the book value of Eggett's shares. 
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No one in the courtroom had any doubt about the jurors' answers. Neither the jurors 
nor Wasatch's counsel suggested that the trial court's question was confusing, or that the trial 
court misunderstood the jurors' answers. If Wasatch really believed the questions or answers 
was confusing, Wasatch had an opportunity and a duty to seek clarification before the jury 
was discharged. That Wasatch did not do so waives its objection to the form of the polling 
question. See, e.g., Bennion, supra, 701 P.2d at 1082 (Utah 1985) ("When special 
interrogatories or verdicts are ambiguous, counsel has an obligation either to object to the 
filing of the verdict or to move that the cause be resubmitted to the jury for clarification" 
before the jury is discharged). Indeed, if Wasatch really believed that the jurors calculated 
the book value of Wasatch, Wasatch could have later presented juror affidavits explaining 
their "true verdict." See discussion at pp. 32-35, supra. 
Wasatch argues that the trial court had no discretion to rephrase Question 5 when it 
questioned the jurors. (Pet. Br. 28.) Wasatch cites no authority for its assertion, which is 
inconsistent with a trial court's generally broad discretion over the form and content of 
interrogatories. See, e.g., E.A. Strout, supra, 665 P.2d at 1324. To preclude the trial court 
from asking a different question from the interrogatory would needlessly handcuff the trial 
court. As this Court stated recently in the criminal context, 
a trial court must be accorded some latitude in questioning a juror in order to 
clarify any confusion arising out of the polling the jury. We acknowledge that 
a trial court may go too far in questioning a juror; trial courts must be wary in 
these circumstances, questioning jurors in a nonconfrontational manner. It is 
both unwise and undesirable that the court should enter into an argument with 
the juror or require an explanation of his change of position. 
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State v. Heaps, 999 P.2d 565, 570 (Utah 2000) (emphasis added). 
Here, the trial court had good reason to ask the foreman if $135,671.96 was the 
amount to be paid for the shares, and to explain two possible interpretations to the jury. If 
the court merely repeated Question 5, it ran the real risk that the foreman or jury would not 
recognize the ambiguity, and would repeat the mistake. Trial courts frequently identify 
possible interpretations when explaining ambiguities or inconsistencies to juries, to ensure 
that the jury understands. The purpose and effect are not to "coerce," but to clarify. 
The trial court never commented on or suggested any view of the evidence, much less 
pressure the jury to accept "its view" of the evidence. The court did not tell the jury that its 
verdict was "irrational," or a "mistake." It did not ask about the jury's deliberations. It did 
not ask how or why the jury reached its answer to Question 5. The court in effect asked one 
question three times-a question to determine what the jury decided. 
Wasatch's assertion that if "this precedent is upheld, no jury verdict is safe from a 
judge who simply disagrees with the result" (Pet. Br. 29) is hyperbole. The precedent should 
not be, as Wasatch would have it, to preclude trial courts from questioning jurors to 
determine if a verdict is informal, insufficient, or ambiguous, and having the juiy clarify it. 
The precedent should be, as the Court of Appeals stated here and this Court stated in Heaps, 
supra, to give the trial court "latitude to ask questions in order to determine the true verdict 
of the jury" (Slip. Op., f 40), so long as those questions are not coercive or confrontational. 
The trial court's questions here easily meet this test. Wasatch tacitly admits this 
through its transparent attempt to taint this Court's review with findings from a wholly 
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unrelated and irrelevant proceeding. (Pet. Br. 29 n. 3 & Add. 81.) Nothing here supports 
Wasatch's assertion that the trial court coerced the jury. 
4. The Trial Court Has the Discretion to Question the Jury and Clarify Its 
Verdict Sua Sponte. 
Wasatch also suggests that the trial court has no discretion under Rule 47(r) to act sua 
sponte. (Pet. Br. 28-9.) The argument is a red herring. 
There can be no doubt that the trial court has authority and discretion to correct 
mistakes or to clarify ambiguous verdicts sua sponte, since it can direct a verdict or grant a 
new trial sua sponte. See, e.g., Brigham v. Moon Lake Electric Ass 'n., 470 P.2d 393, 396 
(Utah 1970) (directed verdict); Goddardv. Hickman, 685 P.2d 530 (Utah 1984) (new trial). 
Indeed, the trial court appears to have questioned the jury sua sponte in Jorgensen, Cook, and 
Brown, supra. 
Further, the decisions cited throughout this Brief establish that a trial court has a duty 
to clarify an informality, insufficiency, or ambiguity at any time before the jury is 
discharged. See, e.g., Jorgensen, supra, 383 P.2d at 935 ("so long as the jury is functioning 
as such in the course of the trial and until it is discharged, it is subject to directions and 
instructions from the court to the end that the issues be fully tried, deliberated upon and a 
correct verdict rendered"). Cf., State v. Heaps, supra, 999 P.2d at 570 ("upon the appearance 
of uncertainty or contingency in the jury verdict, it is the duty of the trial judge to resolve 
that doubt"). 
These decisions also establish that a trial court has a duty to clarify a verdict when a 
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party requests it, and abuses its discretion if it does not do so. See Unit Drilling, supra, 108 
F.3d at 1191; Woodcock, supra, 445 P.2d at 882; Bennion, supra, 701 P.2d at 1082. It makes 
no sense to require a trial court to clarify a jury verdict if a party requests it, but to prohibit 
a trial court from doing so sua sponte; in each instance, the court should have the discretion 
to ensure that the issues are fully tried, deliberated upon and a correct verdict rendered. 
Finally, the fact that the trial court questioned the jury before Eggett sought 
clarification is irrelevant, because Eggett did not appeal the jury verdict. Again, this Court 
can affirm on any ground available to the trial court, even one not relied upon below, and 
Eggett can raise any ground for affirmance. See pp. 17-18, supra. The trial court's sua 
sponte clarification preserves the issue in the absence of an objection. 
C. Any Errors bv the Trial Court in Clarifying the Jury Verdict Are Harmless. 
If the trial court had discretion to ask the jury to clarify its verdict, then any alleged 
error in the manner in which the court questioned jurors and entered the verdict is harmless. 
An error is harmless if the "likelihood of a different outcome in the absence of the error'9 is 
not "sufficiently high [so as] to undermine confidence in the verdict." State v. Adams, 5 P.3d 
642,648 (Utah 2000); see also, Baker v. Cook, supra, 370 P.2d at 266 (affirming trial court's 
questioning of the jury because "[w]e are unable to see from a reading of the record wherein 
defendant was prejudiced by the questions"). 
If the trial court had asked a different question, there can be no doubt that the answer 
would have been the same. The jury foreman twice told the trial court that $135,671.96 was 
book value to be paid for the shares. The jurors unanimously confirmed the foreman's 
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answer. The jury performed the calculation, because $135,671.96 was exactly equal to the 
book value of Eggett's shares, with an adjustment for the suspense account entries 
wrongfully manipulated by Wasatch ($75,452 + $296,252 x 36.5% = $135,671.96). 
Because there is no likelihood that the answers would have been different if the 
questions had been, the Court of Appeals could have found any errors in the form of the 
questions to be harmless, as can this Court. 
III. THE COURT OF APPEALS CORRECTLY AFFIRMED THE 
ATTORNEYS' FEES AWARD. 
Before the Court of Appeals, Wasatch challenged the trial court's attorneys' fees 
award to Eggett, arguing that the trial court failed to apportion recoverable from non-
recoverable fees, and made inadequate findings of fact. (Res. Br. Add. 5.) The Court of 
Appeals affirmed, because Wasatch failed to "marshal the evidence" supporting the trial 
court's apportionment and findings. Wasatch admits that the marshaling requirement applies 
to "challenges of factual findings" (Pet. Br. 32-3); Wasatch attempts to evade its duty to 
marshal the facts and to evade the standard of review (abuse of discretion) by characterizing 
its appeal as a "legal" challenge - i.e., that the law requires the trial court must make an 
apportionment, but here the trial court made none at all. (Pet. Br. 32.) 
The argument ignores the record. The trial court apportioned fees, and found facts: 
Based upon the submissions of the parties, the arguments of counsel, and good 
cause appearing, the Court finds that plaintiff Roger Eggett is entitled to an 
award of costs, expenses, and attorneys' fees in the amount of $60,374.43. 
The Court finds that these costs, expenses, and fees are reasonable. The Court 
also finds that plaintiff Roger Eggett has made a proper and reasonable 
segregation between those claims to which he is entitled to an award of costs, 
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expenses, and fees, and those claims to which he is not entitled to such an 
award. Specifically, the Court finds that (1) the claims brought by Mr. Eggett 
to recover book value for his shares pursuant to his Shareholder Agreement 
were the predominant claims at trial; (2) the facts to be discovered and tried 
on Mr. Eggett's claims pursuant to the Shareholder Agreement are so 
intertwined with the facts to be discovered and tried on the other claims and 
counterclaims that it is not possible to segregate or to distinguish them. 
Accordingly, the Court finds that it is proper and reasonable to segregate those 
costs, expenses, and fees incurred by Mr. Eggett before May 16, 1997, from 
those costs, expenses, and fees incurred by Mr. Eggett after May 16, 1997, 
when Mr. Eggett's claims under the Shareholder Agreement arose. 
Supplemental Judgment (Pet. Br. Add. 20-21). 
Thus, Wasatch's legal challenge has no merit. Wasatch's real disagreement is with 
the trial court's factual findings that Eggett's claims under the Shareholders' Agreement were 
the "predominant claims" at trial, and were so intertwined with the other claims and 
counterclaims that "it is not possible to segregate or to distinguish them." Wasatch made no 
attempt before the Court of Appeals to marshal the facts supporting these findings. Wasatch 
makes no attempt before this Court, even though it asserts that "the claims are easily 
separable and were handled separately throughout discovery and trial." (Pet. Br. 31.) 
The Court of Appeals therefore correctly affirmed the trial court. But even if the 
marshaling requirement did not apply, there are independent grounds on which the Court of 
Appeals would have affirmed the trial court. First, Wasatch waived its argument that the trial 
court did not "document its award with sufficiently detailed findings." (Pet. Br. 30.) 
Wasatch did not object to the sufficiency of the findings before the trial court, and approved 
the findings as to form. (Pet. Br. Add. 21.) To hear Wasatch "complain now" of the 
deficiency "smacks of invited error," which "precludes judicial review." Miller v. Martineau 
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& Co., supra, 983 P.2d at 1116. 
Second, the trial court's findings were well within its discretion. The findings were 
based upon an Affidavit (Pet. Br. Add. 65-73) and Reply Affidavit (Pet. Br. Add. 74-80), 
oral argument, and the trial court's inherent knowledge of the proceedings. The initial 
Affidavit segregated fees incurred before May 16, 1997, from those incurred afterward, 
because the earlier fees related solely to Eggett's claims for additional compensation 
pursuant to the Employment Agreement. (Pet. Br. Add. 67, fl 6-9.) The Reply Affidavit 
redacted certain fees incurred after May 16, 1997, that did not relate to Eggett's claim for 
breach of the Shareholders' Agreement. (Pert. Br. Add. 79-80, f 10). 
Eggett did not segregate fees further, because Eggett's claims under the Shareholders' 
Agreement were inextricably intertwined with his compensation claims, and with Wasatch's 
counterclaims. Eggett's claims under the Shareholders' Agreement required him to prove 
that his termination was wrongful and in bad faith, and a pretext to deny him book value for 
his shares; Eggett had to prove that he had not taken excessive compensation or abused his 
expense account. Accordingly, every fact relating to Eggett's compensation claim and 
Wasatch's counterclaims would have been litigated whether or not those claims had been 
filed, because Wasatch asserted them as a defense to Eggett's claim for book value. (Pet Br. 
Add. 67-75.) Wasatch cannot dispute this. 
"Where the proof a compensable claim and an otherwise non-compensable claim are 
closely related and require proof of the same facts, a successful party is entitled to recover 
its fees incurred in proving all of the related facts." Brown v. David K. Richards & Co., 978 
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P.2d 470,483 (Utah App. 1999), cert denied 994 P.2d 1271 (Utah 1999). In Dejavue, Inc. 
v. U.S. Energy Corp., 993 P.2d 222, 227 (Utah App. 1999) (emphasis added), the Court of 
Appeals affirmed an award of attorneys' fees in substantially similar circumstances: 
The trial court specifically found that the claims advanced by Dejavue, and 
interposed as defenses to the counterclaims, were based on inter-related legal 
theories and arose from a common core of facts.... Each of Dejavue's claims 
submitted to the jury was intertwined with its defense of the breach of contract 
. . .counterclaims and arose from a common core of facts. 
993 P.2d at 227 (emphasis added). 
The trial court found that Eggett's claim for breach of the Shareholders' Agreement 
was the dominant claim at trial, and that an award of all fees after May 16, 1997, was 
appropriate because the claims and facts were intertwined. These findings support the 
allocation and award, and are independent grounds on which this Court should affirm the 
Court of Appeals. 
Finally, to the extent that Eggett prevails, Eggett is entitled to an award of costs and 
attorney's fees incurred on appeal. See Valcarce v. Fitzgerald, supra, 961 P.2d at 319. 
CONCLUSION 
For this reasons stated in this Memorandum, this Court should affirm the Court of 
Appeals, and should award to Eggett his fees and costs incurred on appeal. 
Respectfully submitted this _J_ dajrof^ebruary, 2001. 
Perfin R/Love 
Clyde, Snow, Sessions & Swenson 
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Respondent Roger K. Eggett, Jr. 
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1 THE COURT: (Inaudible) three minutes. 
2 MR. NELSON: Three? Thank you. 
3 In response to Judge Thorne's question--and again, 
4 this goes to the three exceptions to get around--this is 
5 standard language in stock buyout agreements. They're 
6 strictly enforced. There is no case saying that if you prove 
7 bad faith you can ignore the audited book value. There is no 
8 case. 
9 THE COURT: Tell me why this shouldn't be the case 
10 that says that. It seems a little odd to me that if wefve 
11 applied the covenant of good faith and fair dealing across 
12 the board to contracts why, in a shareholders buyout 
13 agreement where there is a lot of chance to manipulate and 
14 not give someone their reasonable expectations, we should 
15 carve out an exception to the general rule in Utah. 
16 MR. NELSON: Well, it's a separate claim under the 
17 contract. And that's what I was saying before. If they want 
18 to allege that there was bad faith in presenting these 
19 adjustments, fine, put a separate question on the verdict and 
20 ask that. 
21 THE COURT: So you don't disagree with me that as a 
22 threshold matter that if it were properly pled and tried that 
23 it ought to apply? 
24 MR. NELSON: I agree. Sure, I don't disagree with 
25 that. That's Utah law and nobody disagrees with that. I'm 
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1 just saying it wasn't part of this trial. Itfs not in the 
2 jury verdict. Bad faith isn't there. And so, yeah, go 
3 ahead, if you want to collect for bad faith, but give us--
4 hold us to the contract on the book value. That's all I'm 
5 saying. 
6 Let me go on to the second issue on the jury 
7 verdict, and I'll wrap up on that. 
8 Let me say one more thing on the contract. This 
9 Court should not permit the plaintiff to invoke the contract 
10 to show entitlement to book value and then ignore the 
11 contract when it comes to defining book value. If he's going 
12 to rest on the contract for book value, we're going to rest 
13 on the contract to define book value and hold him to it. 
14 Now on the jury verdict. First of all, the 
15 plaintiff--counsel goes on to this dialogue that the judge 
16 had with the jury to say that the jury reached what they 
17 intended to do. The problem with that is that the questions 
18 were impermissible to begin with. The judge should never 
19 have asked any questions of the jury. He was not entitled to 
20 under the rules, because there was no ambiguity on the face 
21 of the question, no mistake on the face of the answer. 
22 It's an answer that anyone would look at and say, 
23 *Now, of course we can't pin it down to a penny of where the 
24 jury got it." We often don't know how juries come up with 
25 their numbers. But there's nothing on the face of that 
25 
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prove bad faith, while using the adjustments to alter the contract book value of Eggett's 
stock,[ 
POINT II: ALTERNATIVELY, EGGETT IS BOUND BY THE UNAMBIGUOUS 
JURY VERDICT ON THE BOOK VALUE OF HIS STOCK. 
Eggett argues that the trial judge was justified in questioning the jury to "clarify" 
its "ambiguous" response to Special Verdict Question 5. However, the question itself 
leaves no ambiguity on whether it was asking for Wasatch's book value or Eggett's book 
value. The question plainly asks, "what was the 'book value' of Wasatch Energy." 
(Petition Appendix, p. 23, emp. added.) Neither does the answer of "$135,671.96" create 
any ambiguity because that answer falls well within the range of values argued by the 
parties. In the absence of patent error in the verdict, the trial judge had no discretion to 
ask the jury a different, revised question of whether that figure was the book value of 
Eggett's stock. That was not the question on the verdict form, and the judge had no 
business revising the question after it had been submitted to and answered by the jury. 
(Petition, pp. 13-16.) 
The court of appeals held, and Eggett argues, that a trial judge is justified in 
questioning the jury not just for "patent" error, but even for "possible" error. However, 
such a rule finds no support in the law. The case of Jorgensen v. Gonzales, 383 P.2d 934 
(Utah 1963), relied upon by the court of appeals, specifically states that Rule 47(r) 
1
 Eggett's Response goes on and on about unquestioned Utah law regarding the covenant of good 
faith and fair dealing. No one questions that law or its application to the Shareholders' Agreement. All 
such arguments are immaterial because Eggett neither claimed nor received any damages for breach of 
that covenant. The issue is whether Eggett is bound by the contract book value of his stock. The court of 
appeals held that he is not, and this Court must correct that error. 
